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Abstract  
 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology 
has been widely used in ubiquitous infrastructures. On 
the other hand, the low-cost RFID system has potential 
risks such as privacy and security problems, which 
would be a big barrier for the application. First of all, 
we analyze the current security protocols for the RFID 
system. To protect user privacy and remove security 
vulnerabilities, we propose a robust and privacy 
preserving mutual authentication protocol that is 
suitable for the low-cost RFID environment. Finally, 
the correctness of the proposed authentication protocol 
is proved by the BAN logic. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As an important technology, the secure problems of 
the RFID system attract a lot of attention. The low cost 
demanded for RFID tags forces them to be very 
resource limited. Thus the current Cryptographic 
algorithm can’t be directly used on them. A robust 
authentication protocol plays a key role in the RFID 
system. Unfortunately, most of the existing proposed 
protocols have some problems. Therefore, we put 
forward a robust RFID protocol and give a 
comprehensive analysis of it.  
The paper is organized as following: in section 2, 
the related protocols are introduced. Our approach is 
proposed in section 3. In section 4, we analyze our 
protocol in several aspects. Finally, we make the 
conclusion in section 5.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
In the HBVI protocol [6], the TID is increased in 
each successful authentication session which can resist 
replay attack. The protocol also resolves the location 
problem by making a tag’s ID randomized in each 
interrogation. Unfortunately, this protocol can not 
resist man-in-the-middle attack. The attacker can query 
any tag before it is interrogated by the legitimate reader 
and he can be authenticated with the obtained data. 
HB++[3] relies on the computational hardness of 
Leaning Parity with Noise problem. It is also prone to 
the similar attack as Selwyn Piramuthu analyzed in[2]. 
This is a great problem that the protocol may possibly 
reveal the secrets to the adversary. On the other hand, 
the protocol is a unilateral authentication protocol. 
LMAP [4] only uses the most basic operations such 
as bitwise XOR(⊕),bitwise OR(∨),bitwise AND(∧) 
and addition of mod2m(+). The random number is 
generated by the reader. Thus the cost is very low. But 
it also has some problems. As Li and Wang showed in 
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[1], this protocol is prone to be under two kinds of 
active attacks: De-synchronization Attack and Full 
Disclosure Attack. 
 
3. Robust Protocol Design 
 
3.1. Main Idea 
 
Our protocol is based on the challenge - response 
mechanism. The contents of tags can be searched out 
by the server through index-pseudonym (IDS). The 
mutual authentication between tags and the server is 
fulfilled by sharing a secret key. In each round, the 
back-end server and the tag update the secret key, 
which ensures that the tag’s response is random. In our 
protocol, all important messages are encrypted with the 
hash algorithm. 
 
3.2. System Assumptions and Initialization 
 
We assume that each tag shares a random secret 
key with the back-end server in the initiation. The 
secret keys are stored in the back-end database and can 
be indexed by the IDS. Tags only need to have a 
one-way hash function and the XOR ability. The reader 
and the server share a secret key ,K, and can carry out 
the keyed hash operation with the K. The records 
including the IDS, the key and the application-related 
information are managed by the back-end server. 
Besides, the reader is not regarded as the trusted third 
party (TTP). So it must be authenticated by the server.                                                                
 
3.3. Detailed Description  
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             Figure 1. Our protocol 
 The process of our proposed protocol is shown as 
figure 1. 
(1)Challenge: Firstly the reader generates a random 
number r and calculates S = HK(r). 
   (2)Respond: While receiving the challenge, the tag 
responds IDS, m=H(key⊕S⊕C) to the reader. The 
Chip unique serial number, C, is embedded in each tag.  
   (3)The reader forwards the certification 
information to the back-end server, including r, S, IDS 
and m.  
(4)While receiving the authentication information 
from the reader, the back-end server firstly certifies the 
reader through judging whether the received S is equal 
to HK(r). If so, the server considers the reader is valid 
and retrieves the corresponding information of the tag, 
such as the secret key, IDS, C and so on, through the 
received IDS. Then the server calculates H(key⊕S⊕
C) and compares it to the received m. If they are equal, 
a random number ,R, is generated by the back-end 
server, which is used for XORing with the old key to 
generate the new secret key key’=key⊕R and the new 
index IDS’=H(key’).  
Here we have two problems must be solved, the 
uniqueness of the IDS and the anti-synchronization 
between the back-end server and the tags. A reasonable 
mechanism is designed to solve the first problem. We 
make the server testing the uniqueness of the H (key’). 
If the new index is not unique, the server renews R 
until H(key’) becomes unique. For the second problem, 
an anti-synchronous resistant mechanism is needed 
since the attacker may probably disturb the
synchronization of the update between the server and 
the tag. If the attacker is successful, the valid tag can 
never be legally certified. We use the existing 
anti-synchronous resistant mechanism such as the 
mechanism described in [5] to solve this problem.                   
(5) While receiving the information from the reader, 
the tag retrieves the stored key and calculates H(key⊕
R). If the output is equal to the received H(key⊕R), the 
tag considers that the reader is valid and carries out the 
update accordingly. 
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4. Analysis of Our Protocol 
 
4.1. Logic Analysis 
 
In this section, we will validate the correctness of 
the proposed protocol based on the BAN logic[7]. 
BAN logic is the most important tool to formalize the 
authentication protocols. The basis for the logic is the 
belief of a party in the truth of a formula. Although 
there are other validation logics, we have chosen BAN 
because its formal process is simple and robust. 
Since the main entities of this authentication 
process are the back-end server and the tag, we idealize 
the entities in the protocol as B and T. 
(1)Generic type of protocol 
Message 1: B—>T： S 
Message 2: T—>B: H（key）,H(key⊕S⊕C) 
Message 3: B—>T： R, H（key⊕R） 
(2)Idealized protocol 
Message2: T—>B： H( B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T ), H(( B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T ),S,C) 
Message 3: B—>T：H((B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ Tሻ,R) 
(3)Initial assumptions：Firstly, we can see the tag and 
the back-end server both believe their shared secret key 
and it’s rational because this is the basic purpose of the 
protocol’s design. Because the tag updates the secret 
key in each round, the key can be regarded as fresh.  
The assumption for the effectiveness of the key:  
(A1)
 
 B ≡|  B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T, (A2)  T ≡|  B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T  
The assumption for the fresh of the random number:   
(A3) B ≡| #(R) (A4) B ≡| #(S) (A5) T ≡| #(key) 
(4)The goal of the protocol ： 
B ≡| T|～#( B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T), T ≡| B|～#(B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T) 
(5)Verification: 
From the message 2, we can educe that  
B?H((B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T),S,C) 
From the assumption A1,we can see： B ≡|  B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T 
According to the Interpretation Rule: P|ؠQ
K՞P,Pٱழ௑வY
P|ؠQ|׽X   
We can deduce: B ≡| T|～H( (B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T),S,C) 
Because B can search out the key and the chip serial 
number C of the tag, we can educe that:    
B? C, B? S, B? ( B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T) 
Applying the hash rule: 
P|ؠQ|׽HሺXଵ,Xଶ…..X୬ሻ,PٱXଵ,PٱXଶ,…..PٱX୬
P|ؠQ|׽ሺXଵ,Xଶ,…..X୬ሻ  
We can deduce that:
 
 B ≡| T|～( (B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T),S,C) 
Applying the recognizability rule: P|ؠQ|׽ሺX,YሻP|ؠQ|׽X   
We can deduce that: B ≡| T|～(B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T)① 
And from the assumption A4: B ≡| #(S),  
Applying freshness rule: P|ؠ#ሺXሻP|ؠ#ሺX,Yሻ 
We can deduce that: B ≡| #( (B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T),S,C)②,  
Applying ①and②: B ≡| T|～#( B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T) 
The first goal has been proved, now we will prove the 
second goal: 
From the message 3, we can see: T?H(key, R)  
From the assumption A2: T ≡|  B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T  
According to the interpretation Rule:  P|ؠQ
K՞P,Pٱழ௑வY
P|ؠQ|׽X ,  
We can deduce that: T ≡| B|～H((B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T),R) 
Because the tag can see R: T? R, T?  B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T 
Applying hash rule, we can deduce that:  
T ≡| B|～(B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T,R)③ 
From the assumption A5: T ≡| #(key) 
Applying the freshness rule:
 
 P|ؠ#ሺXሻP|ؠ#ሺX,Yሻ  
We can deduce that: T ≡| #( B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T,R)④ 
According to ③and④:T ≡| B|～#( B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T,R) 
Applying the recognizability rule: P|ؠQ|׽ሺX,YሻP|ؠQ|׽X  
We can finally deduce that: T ≡| B|～#( B ୩ୣ୷ርሮ T) 
So the second goal has been proved. 
 
4.2. Theoretical evaluation 
 
We evaluate the protocol by judging whether the 
protocol satisfies the security requirement:  
(1)Data Confidentiality and Integrity: The 
important information is hidden by the hash function. 
In addition, we link C to the authentication information, 
so as to ensure the data integrity. 
(2) Scalability: We use the IDS as an index to help 
the server to search out a tag’s information, so the 
searching is efficient. 
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(3)Availability 
Man-in-the-middle Attack Prevention：Our protocol 
is based on a mutual authentication, in which two 
random numbers R and r, refresh in each round of the 
protocol, are used. Moreover, we make the server 
validate the reader through the S=HK(r). Thus the 
adversary who wants to impersonate the valid reader 
can be detected. 
Forgery Resistance：The chip serial number C is 
embedded into the tag and refers to the authentication 
information. Thereby the simple forgery of tag can’t 
make any sense. In addition, the secrete information 
stored in each tag is pertinent to itself. 
Replay Attack Prevention: Since the reader 
challenges the tag with the random information, the 
replay attack in step 2 can be prevented. Since the key 
and the m refresh in each round, the replay attack in 
step 3 and step 5 can be detected. 
De-synchronization Resistance: we use the existing 
anti-synchronous resistant mechanism such as the 
mechanism in [5] to meet this requirement. 
(4)Location Privacy: If the responses from the tag 
are constant, the location of the tag can be tracked. In 
our protocol, the response of the tag will be random in 
each protocol run. Hence the location privacy is 
guaranteed. 
(5)Forward Security：Since the key updating is 
fulfilled whenever the authentication is successful, a 
future security compromise on an RFID tag will not 
reveal the data previously transmitted.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As we discuss, the proposed protocol is correct 
and suits for the low-cost environment. It can also 
ensure the privacy of the tag, meet most of the 
security requirements and resist the typical attacks. 
Several mechanisms are used to make the protocol 
more robust, such as the dynamic refresh 
mechanism, the anti-collision mechanism and 
challenge-response mechanism. The further work is to 
design a more robust anti-synchronous resistant 
mechanism to enhance our protocol. 
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